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ABSTRACT 
Eldridge, Tami Marie, M.A., 9/11/92 Clinical Psychology 
Normative Study of the Portland Digit Recognition Test: 
An Assessment of the Effects of Motivation on Neuropsychological 
Evaluations (103 pp.) 
Director: Herman A. Walters, Ph.D. 
This study provided normative data for the Portland Digit 
Recognition Test (PDRT), a forced-choice recognition memory test 
designed to aid in the detection of malingering in patients undergoing 
neuropsychological evaluations. The effects of age, gender and 
neuromedical risk on PDRT performance were examined. The extent to 
which performance varied as a function of the length of the interpolated 
delay interval also was evaluated. Likert-type items assessing 
motivation and estimation of enhanced performance for compensation were 
administered following the PDRT. Significant decrements in performance 
with longer delay intervals were hypothesized. It was predicted that 
the results would be negatively skewed, with all subjects obtaining 
scores appreciably above the chance level. 
The normative sample consisted of 120 college students and local 
volunteers who passed a preliminary neuromedical screening. Results 
were negatively skewed with all subjects scoring appreciably above the 
chance level. Males scored significantly higher than females on Trial 
Block 1 (5 sec. delay). Medical risk factors associated with 
educational difficulties and the Total Risk score were found to covary 
significantly with Trial Block 1 scores. There was a significant 
decrement in performance between the 5 sec. and 15 sec. trial blocks, as 
hypothesized; however, there was a significant increment in performance 
between the 15 sec. and 30 sec. trial blocks. A significant increment 
in performance also was observed between the first and second 30 sec. 
trial blocks. Differential endorsements on the Motivation item were 
associated with significant variation in PDRT scores. 
An excluded sample of 89 subjects who did not pass the preliminary 
screening were given the same assessments as the normative sample. 
Results for the excluded sample were similar to those for the normative 
sample, with the exception of there being no main effects for sex and 
significant main effects for the Compensation item. Scores for the 
excluded sample were not significantly different from those for the 
normative sample. Implications of the present study are discussed in 
light of previous research by Binder and Willis (1991). 
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1 
Introduction 
Important decisions with the potential to change the 
courses of individuals' lives are routinely made on the 
basis of psychological assessment data. Young children are 
determined to possess intellectual handicaps such as 
learning disabilities or mental retardation, potential 
employees are screened for their efficacy in a given 
occupational role and criminals are assessed for their 
competency to stand trial. Because of the critical nature 
of the decisions which rest on these assessments, the 
psychometric soundness of the measurement instruments 
utilized is crucial, thus well researched. However, even a 
well constructed assessment device may be vulnerable to 
produce erroneous data if the individual who is being 
assessed responds in a way which is inconsistent with his or 
her actual behavior or ability level. The motivations of 
the subjects of psychological evaluations are undoubtedly as 
complex and diverse as the goals of the assessments. While 
many situations are structured such that an individual has 
intrinsic and/or extrinsic motivation to respond sincerely 
or to perform at an optimal level, there are other instances 
in which one could be motivated to respond deceptively. 
Motives may vary widely in their origin and intensity, from 
avoiding prosecution by feigning incompetence, securing 
compensation by exaggerating or simulating an injury, to 
meeting dependency needs by pretending to be mentally ill. 
2 
Deception, which is also referred to as malingering or 
dissimulation in the literature is defined in the DSM-III-R 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987) as the "intentional 
production of false or grossly exaggerated symptoms, 
motivated by external incentives..." (p. 360). Resnick 
(1988) reports that estimates of the incidence of malingered 
psychological symptoms after an injury range from one 1% to 
over 50%. 
While malingering traditionally has been viewed as a 
dichotomous variable, Rogers (1988) suggests that it should 
be viewed in terms of gradations existing along a continuum. 
A related issue, concerning the degree to which 
dissimulation is under conscious control, cannot be 
addressed clinically due to the absence of "behavioral or 
clinical concomitants from which to assess conscious 
intention" (Cunnien, 1988). The inability to ascertain 
individuals' level of conscious motivation seriously 
compromises clinicians' ability to discriminate between 
intentional malingering and conversion disorders, in which, 
following an injury, individuals exhibit persistent pain and 
loss of function which is unexplainable in terms of organic 
pathology. Even in relatively more clear-cut cases of 
malingering, clinicians are hesitant to make a diagnosis of 
malingering due to the ethical and legal ramifications of 
"false positive" errors. 
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Clinicians vs. Lawyers; Fortifying vs. Discrediting the 
Validity of Psychological Assessment Data 
Due to the current lack of objective indices of 
malingering, a heated controversy has arisen in the 
dissimulation literature between researchers representative 
of two major factions of professionals, clinical 
psychologists and lawyers. Researchers supporting the 
efficacy of psychological assessment techniques and 
testimony are attempting to establish valid and reliable 
indicators for the detection of malingering (e.g., Rawling & 
Brooks, 1990). Lawyers, who in the course of defending or 
prosecuting litigants often are highly motivated to 
discredit the testimony of clinical neuropsychologists, are 
attempting to establish empirically that clinicians cannot 
distinguish between malingerers and nonmalingerers at a rate 
much better than chance (e.g., Faust, 1988; Ziskin, 1988). 
The confirmational biases associated with these opposing 
hypotheses makes the current literature in this area 
difficult to evaluate and interpret. 
The paradigm employed by David Faust, the most prolific 
researcher in the lawyer faction, involves having clinicians 
blindly (i.e., without having conducted the assessment) 
evaluate protocols, some or all of which are bogus, to 
determine whether a diagnosis of neuropsychological 
impairment is appropriate. In a controversial study (Faust, 
Hart & Guilmette, 1988) children were instructed to "fake 
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bad" on a comprehensive neuropsychological assessment with 
minimal coaching as to how to proceed. Because 93% of the 
clinicians who reviewed the cases diagnosed abnormality, the 
researchers concluded that individuals can fake believable 
deficits on neuropsychological assessments. In a two-part 
follow-up, Faust, Hart, Guilmette & Arkes (1988) purportedly 
fortified this claim by instructing three teenagers to "fake 
bad" on neuropsychological testing. In the first study, the 
test results and a fabricated history of mild to moderate 
head injury were sent to a representative sample of clinical 
neuropsychologists, 75% of whom judged the test results to 
be abnormal and attributed the results to cortical 
dysfunction. None detected malingering. In the second 
study, the effects of forewarning on the case appraisal were 
examined by sending equal numbers of actual and feigned 
results to a new sample of neuropsychologists who were 
informed of a 50% base rate for malingering. Despite 
confidence in their evaluations, clinicians did not surpass 
the level of chance in their detection of malingering. 
Faust et al. again concluded that convincing deficits can be 
faked on neuropsychological assessments and further that 
"clinicians' overconfidence in their ability to detect 
simulation may partly explain why so little research has 
been devoted to this topic (p. 508)." 
In a response to these claims, Bigler (1990) attacked 
the external validity of the Faust et al. research on the 
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basis of a number of methodological issues, including the 
limitations of the questionnaire format utilized in the 
study, the inexperience of the neuropsychological judges 
employed and the questionable nature of the process used to 
select them. 
Faust and Guilmette's (1990) response to Bigler's 
criticism is well summarized by their article's title "To 
Say It's Not So Doesn't Prove That It Isn't: Research on the 
Detection of Malingering. Reply to Bigler." A fervent 
response to Faust and Guilmette's assertion by the clinical 
neuropsychological community in the form of research is 
currently underway (P. Bach, personal communication, August 
1991). 
The "simulation malingering paradox" has been used to 
identify measures which discriminate the response patterns 
of faking subjects from normal controls and/or patients with 
brain damage. These studies involve administering a number 
of standardized tests and tests specifically designed to 
detect malingering, after which multivariate statistics 
generally are applied to identify discriminant functions 
which reliably discriminate between groups. In addition, 
test profiles are scrutinized for internal inconsistency of 
deficit patterns (Benton, 1961; Boone & Filskov, 1990; 
Goebel, 1983; Heaton, Smith, Lehman & Vogt, 1978; Kerr, 
Gramling, Arora, Beck, Morin, Cole & Irby, 1990; Pankrantz, 
1988; Rawling and Brooks, 1990; Suffield, Davidson, Nantau, 
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Orenczuk & Mandel, 1990). While group differences between 
subjects feigning malingering and nonmalingerers repeatedly 
have been established utilizing this paradigm, the clinical 
utility of such procedures for identifying malingering in 
individual patients is limited due to the absence of cross-
validation data on specific indices and cut-off scores 
(Boone & Filskov, 1990). In addition, even if measures 
could be devised and cross-validated on the basis of inter-
and intrasubtest inconsistency within an extensive battery 
of assessments, the components of which may not be relevant 
to a particular patient, there may be legal, ethical and 
practical constraints to employing such laborious methods in 
the detection of malingering. 
There would be obvious advantages to a simply 
administered screening device which could signal the 
possible existence of malingering at the outset of a 
neuropsychological evaluation, so that subsequent behavioral 
observations and techniques could be employed to 
substantiate or dispute its existence. Several such 
techniques have been devised and tested (Pankratz, 1988). 
Most of these techniques are designed such that they appear 
more difficult than they actually are, thus the malingering 
subject routinely performs considerably below expected 
levels, unwittingly revealing his dissimulation. Possibly 
the most effective techniques identified to date for the 
detection of malingering are forced-choice techniques in 
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which the subject has a 50/50 chance of responding correctly 
to each item; thus, over a number of trials, response rates 
significantly below the level of chance suggest the 
deliberate production of wrong answers (Binder & Willis, 
1991; Pankratz, 1983). Often, individuals instructed to 
"fake bad," subjectively experience the 50% hit rate as "too 
successful" and consequently produce scores which are 
appreciably below chance (Binder & Pankratz, 1987). Hiscock 
and Hiscock (1989) recently refined one such technique, the 
Portland Digit Recognition Test - a forced choice digit 
recognition task. The task as described by Binder and 
Willis (1991) involves the auditory presentation of 5-digit 
strings, followed by a 5 or 15 sec. delay ("Easy items"), or 
a 30 sec. delay ("Hard items"), during which the subject 
performs a distractor task (counting backward from 20, 50 or 
100), after which a visual probe card with the target item 
and a distractor is presented. Prior to the presentation of 
the "Hard items" subjects are told that the task will become 
more difficult due to the lengthening of interpolated delay 
interval. Binder and Willis (1991) subsequently 
demonstrated that it was possible to differentiate subjects 
with different motivational levels on the basis of their 
performance on this simply administered test of recent 
memory. Patients receiving financial compensation as a 
result of minor head trauma performed significantly more 
poorly on the Portland Digit Recognition Test than patients 
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with well-documented brain dysfunction or affective 
disorders who were not applying for compensation. These 
findings are compelling in that this is the first research 
to demonstrate significant group differences in an actual 
patient population utilizing one simply administered 
assessment device. 
Rationale and Design 
It seems that the next step in facilitating the use of 
the Portland Digit Recognition Test in clinical settings 
would be to establish a baseline against which an individual 
patient's performance may be compared. Consequently, the 
purpose of the present study was to establish the normal 
performance of subjects not at risk for neurological 
impairment on the Portland Digit Recognition Test, so that 
deviations from this expected pattern could be delineated 
more effectively in clinical settings. While a non-patient 
group was included in the Binder and Willis (1991) study, 
the sample size was extremely small (n=13). The present 
study utilized a much larger sample size (n=120) to increase 
the probability that significant normal trends would be 
uncovered and to decrease the probability that results would 
be affected unduly by chance fluctuation. Also, Binder and 
Willis (1991) reported significant age differences across 
subject groups which was not controlled because no 
significant relationship between age and performance was 
found. It could be argued that the diversity of the 
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subjects included in the Binder and Willis (1991) sample 
could be responsible for the absence of age-related 
differences in performance. The more homogeneous sample 
utilized in the present study was stratified for age to 
increase the likelihood of uncovering age differences, 
should they exist. Similarly, while Binder and Willis 
(1991) found that males and females in their sample had 
almost identical means, the present sample was stratified 
according to gender, so that the effect of this variable in 
a larger, less heterogeneous sample could be assessed. 
Also, the present study included additional parameters for 
analysis. Medical risk indices were quantified (See 
"Method" section) and included in the data analysis. In 
addition, decay curves for the various time delays were 
graphed for comparison across the subject groups. 
In addition to enhancing the usefulness of this 
instrument in clinical settings, the present study was 
intended to contribute to laying the groundwork for future 
investigation aimed at elucidating the dynamics of this 
definitionally maligned phenomenon - malingering. It 
sometimes seems that after a behavioral phenomenon which is 
perceived as negative is labeled as such and targeted for 
identification solely for the purpose of eradication, the 
perspective through which it is viewed is narrowed to the 
extent that complex dynamics may be obscured if not ignored. 
It is hoped that by providing a gauge against which the 
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performance of individuals suspected of malingering can be 
compared, systematic discrepancies may be uncovered and 
further research into the intricacies of this ill-understood 
phenomenon may be designed and implemented. 
The global construct of malingering considered in the 
context of a psychological evaluation has significant 
potential theoretical importance. As greater definitional 
clarity regarding the underlying dynamics of this phenomenon 
is achieved, subtypes of the behavior and factors in the 
environment and individuals which predispose its occurrence 
may be identified, providing the dual benefit of aiding 
clinicians in assessing and treating their clients and 
enhancing scientific understanding of the complexities of 
human motivation. 
Relevant Memory Research 
Hintzman (1990) described two major trends which have 
been evident in recent memory research, efforts toward the 
development of formal theoretical models (labeled 
"connectionist"), and an experimental paradigm involving the 
comparison of different memory tasks (labeled 
"dissociationist"). Connectionist or "neural network" 
theories have received considerable attention recently to 
the extent that they have been declared a "paradigm shift" 
for psychology. Hintzman describes the "dissociation" 
method of experimentation as "enormously influential." It 
is viewed as an outgrowth of the "proliferation of tasks" 
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designed to measure memory, which resulted inevitably in the 
comparison of different tasks as a means of clarifying the 
mechanisms involved in different forms of memory and memory 
involving various stimuli. While a discussion of the 
subtleties of connectionism and dissociationism is beyond 
the scope of the present paper, the interested reader is 
referred to Hintzman (1990) for a thorough review. 
There are several dual-process theories of recognition 
which have persisted for some time (e.g., Atkinson & Juola, 
1973; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Johnston et al., 1985; Mandler, 
1980). Mandler (1980) reviewed the evidence for these 
theoretical positions and substantial support for the models 
was provided. The basic premise of these models is that a 
"rapid, direct access familiarity response (based on trace 
strength, perceptual integration, or perceptual fluency, 
depending on the model) is separate from a slower recall or 
search process based on associative or elaborative 
processing." (Johnson & Hasher, 1987; p. 643). Gillund & 
Shiffrin (1984) have proposed that these models may have 
over-emphasized the search factor. They suggest that the 
familiarity responses underlying recognition are affected 
both by the associations between items and between items and 
context, essentially that the activation level of the item 
is determined by the simultaneous activation of episodic 
traces, which is conceptually similar to Hintzman's (1986) 
position that recognition relies on "echo intensity" 
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(Johnson & Hasher, 1987). 
Issues of importance in recognition research have 
included investigating: age differences in recognition 
performance; gender differences; practice effects; modality 
match between stimulus and probe conditions; similarity 
between old and new test items (probes and distractors); and 
repetition effects. Pertinent results will be reviewed 
briefly for the purpose of buttressing the hypotheses which 
follow and providing the rationale for implementing some of 
the control measures described in the methods section. 
While progressive decrements in overall memory with 
advancing age tend to be the general rule, closer 
examination of age effects on different types of memory 
tasks reveals that the pattern is considerably more complex. 
Bowles and Poon (1982) examined age differences in 
recognition memory utilizing a standard two-alternative 
forced-choice paradigm and found no significant difference 
in accuracy between the younger adults (mean age = 22) and 
older adults (mean age = 72); however, the distribution of 
scores for the older group differed in that it was bimodal 
with the upper mode not differing from that of the younger 
group, but the lower mode representing a significant 
decrement in performance. Utilizing the Rey Auditory Verbal 
Learning Test, Bleecker, Bolla-Wilson, Agnew and Myers 
(1988) found that while age and sex accounted for a 
significant portion of the variance on a recall task, the 
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recognition trial was not affected by age or sex. Craik and 
McDowd (1987) found greater age losses in recall than 
recognition, suggesting that it fits with the general scheme 
that older people perform less well on any difficult task; 
however, the researchers preferred to substitute the concept 
of "difficulty," which may be subject to various 
interpretations with that of tasks requiring "more self-
initiated activity or more processing resources." Results 
from Light and Anderson (1985) appear to support this 
hypothesis in that age-related decline in recognition of 
prose (which could be seen as involving higher level 
processing) was found. Scrutiny of age-related performance 
on tasks presumably requiring relatively less complex 
processing on the Wechsler Memory Scale - Revised (e.g., 
Digit Span; Figural Memory) reveals consistent, slight 
decrements across age groups of apparently non-significant 
proportions (i.e., when contiguous groups are compared). 
Unfortunately, no study examining age differences in a 
forced-choice memory task employing a Brown-Peterson 
paradigm could be found other than Binder and Willis (1991) 
which found no correlation between age and level of 
performance. The diversity inherent in the subjects 
utilized in this study makes it unclear whether this is a 
reliable finding. It is possible that performance of a 
distractor task during the delay interval could increase the 
processing complexity of the PDRT to the extent that age 
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differences may become evident given a sufficiently large 
sample size with relatively uniform characteristics. 
With the exception of certain instances of facial 
recognition (e.g., McKelvie, 1984) gender differences in 
recognition memory repeatedly have been found to be 
negligible. 
Postman (1982) found no evidence of practice effects 
with feedback and experience on either a yes-no or forced-
choice recognition test, which the author attributed to "the 
difficulty of identifying and implementing test-appropriate 
strategies" (p. 333). Elliott, Geiselman & Thomas (1981) 
used a four-alternative recognition test within a modified 
Brown-Peterson paradigm and found that performance decreased 
more quickly with increased length of the distraction 
interval when the test modality (auditory or visual) did not 
match the modality of presentation than when the modalities 
did match. Other evidence suggests that there is better 
recall for recency items presented in the auditory modality 
than for items presented in the visual modality (Horton & 
Mills, 1984). 
Tulving (1981) describes a robust rule regarding 
similarity in recognition memory, that is, "recognition 
accuracy is inversely related to the similarity between the 
old and new test items" (p. 479) with the exception of a 
relatively more complex situation involving memory for 
photographs. Similarity between old and new items has been 
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referred to as "a very powerful variable" (Kintsch, 1970) 
and as "the most important of stimulus variables affecting 
perception and recognition alike" (Podgorny & Shepard, 
1978) . 
Repetition effects have been found to be significant in 
enhancing performance on memory tasks. Recognition has been 
found to be increased monotonically as a function of the 
number of item presentations (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 
1988). 
Research Objectives and Hypotheses 
While the primary purpose of the present study was to 
provide normative data for the Portland Digit Recognition 
Test, another purpose was to investigate whether there were 
significant differences in performance on the test between 
subject groups as a function of age, sex and medical risk 
status. 
Several hypotheses were put forth on the basis of the 
research just reviewed. It was predicted that all subjects 
would perform at or above the chance level, with the 
preponderance of subjects performing at a level considerably 
above the chance level and no subjects performing 
significantly below chance. Similarly, it was predicted 
that the frequency distribution of subjects' recognition 
scores would be negatively skewed. It was expected that 
performance levels in the present study would be slightly 
below that of normal subjects in Binder and Willis' (1991) 
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study due to the fact that a lower mean level of education 
was likely in the present sample. 
It was predicted that there would be significant 
differences between overall subject performances on Easy vs. 
Hard items, with a significant decrement in overall 
performance exhibited between the short (5 and 15 sec.) vs. 
longer (30 sec.) distractor interval due to the interpolated 
task interfering with rehearsal (Brown, 1958; Peterson and 
Peterson, 1959). 
Method 
Subjects 
An age and sex stratified sample of 120 subjects 
passing the preliminary neuromedical screening (described 
below) was obtained, including 30 subjects (15 male, 15 
female) in each of the following age groups: 18-20; 21-25; 
26-3 0; 31-45. The total number of subjects tested in the 
process of obtaining the 120 screened subjects was 243. 
Subjects who unambiguously did not pass the screening 
constituted the "excluded" sample (n=89). Please consult 
Table 1 for a breakdown of excluded subjects by age and sex. 
The remaining 34 subjects were not included in either the 
normative or excluded sample: 20 subjects provided 
insufficient information on the screening for a 
determination of whether or not they passed the screening to 
be made; 8 subjects were eliminated due to missing data; and 
6 subjects were eliminated because they passed a lightened 
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version of the screening (described later in this section), 
but were not needed for the normative sample as the subject 
quotas in the various cells had been fulfilled. 
During the initial stages of data collection, subjects 
were exclusively Introductory Psychology students at the 
University of Montana who participated to obtain 
experimental credit which is required for their successful 
completion of the course. Later in the data collection 
period, alternate methods of subject recruitment were 
employed due to a large number of subjects not passing the 
neuromedical screening and due to there being insufficient 
numbers of older students enrolled in the Introductory 
Psychology course. A number of subjects were recruited 
through other University courses. Some of these subjects 
participated on a voluntary basis, while others were offered 
extra credit by their professors. Subjects were also 
recruited through sign-up sheets posted at various locations 
on the campus. These subjects were paid $5.00 for their 
participation. Finally, several subjects were recruited on 
a voluntary basis from the local smokejumper base. 
Subjects were screened for neuromedical risk factors 
utilizing a two-part screening questionnaire developed by A. 
Tindall (1990). The Preliminary Screening (See Appendix A) 
included questions regarding the subjects' neurological, 
psychiatric and drug history. Subjects were excluded from 
the normative sample on the basis of Tindall's (1990) 
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criteria (See Appendix A); however, data from unambiguously 
excluded subjects were subjected to post-hoc analysis with 
the hope that significant trends in the data in accordance 
with neurological status might be uncovered. Due to 
difficulty obtaining subjects in sufficient numbers later in 
the data collection period, the exclusion criteria were 
lightened to include subjects in the normative sample who 
reported having had a neuropsychological test, but had not 
been evaluated by a neurologist or a neurosurgeon and had 
not been diagnosed with a neurological condition. 
The second portion of the neuromedical screening, the 
Medical Risk Screening (See Appendix B) included questions 
regarding risk factors in the following seven categories: 
early development, education, mild head injury, toxicity, 
anoxia, illness risk, and family history. Rather than 
excluding subjects from the normative sample on the basis of 
a certain threshold level of medical risk factors, Tindall's 
(1990) procedure for quantifying the indices and including 
them as a variable for analysis was employed. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival at the testing site, the subject was 
invited into the assessment room during which time the 
examiner attempted to establish rapport. Subjects were told 
that they were free to withdraw from participation at any 
time and were informed of the measures that would be taken 
to safeguard the confidentiality of the information they 
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provided. Subjects initially completed the neuromedical 
screening questionnaires described previously. Subjects 
were administered the Portland Digit Recognition Test by one 
of several trained examiners. Prior to this time the 
examiners became proficient in the administration and 
scoring of the PDRT to maximize standardization and control. 
After the subject and examiner were seated at opposite sides 
of the assessment table, the task was introduced as a test 
of memory. The examiner encouraged the subject to do his or 
her best and then introduced and implemented the assessment 
in accordance with standardized instructions (See Appendix 
C). The examiner recorded subject responses on a PDRT test 
protocol (See Appendix D). 
Due to the research described previously relating to 
repetition effects, it was emphasized in training the 
examiners that subject attention should be gained prior to 
presenting items, because repetition of items was not 
allowed under any circumstance as it would render the 
results invalid. Following administration of the PDRT, 
subjects were given two Likert-type items (See Appendix E). 
The first item was intended to provide the subject's 
retrospective estimation of their level of motivation while 
taking the test. The second item asked subjects to estimate 
the extent to which they felt they could have performed 
better if they had received financial compensation to do so. 
At the conclusion of the assessment period, subjects were 
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given an opportunity to ask any remaining questions they 
might have and they were told how they could learn the 
results following completion of the project. Credit sheets 
for participation were completed for subjects immediately 
following the assessment period. Subject names did not 
appear on the assessment data; rather, all data pertaining 
to a given subject were assigned a code number in order to 
safeguard confidentiality. 
Independent Measures 
Sex, age group membership, Motivation item endorsement, 
Compensation item endorsement, and the eight medical risk 
scores described previously were the independent variables 
used in this study. In addition, for the purpose of 
comparative analyses between the normative and excluded 
group, status with regard to the neuromedical screening 
constituted an independent measure. Those passing the 
screening were considered "normative" subjects while those 
who unambiguously did not pass were the "excluded" subjects. 
Dependent Measures 
Dependent measures obtained from the PDRT included the 
total raw score (number correct) and the raw score for each 
of the four 18-item trial blocks. Trial Block 1 was 
comprised of the 5 sec. delay items; Trial Block 2 was 
comprised of the 15 sec. delay items, Trial Blocks 3 and 4 
were the 30 sec. delay items. The subscores were also 
computed at two levels, rendering two additional dependent 
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measures which are comparable to the subscores utilized in 
Binder and Willis' (1991) research. The 18 five sec. and 18 
fifteen sec. delay trial blocks were combined to constitute 
3 6 "Easy" items; and the two 18-item, 30 sec. trial blocks 
constituted the 36 "Hard" items. 
Results 
Normative Sample 
Means, standard deviations and ranges for the dependent 
variables for the normative group and the excluded group are 
presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 lists descriptive 
statistics for PDRT subscores for Trial Blocks 1 through 4. 
Descriptive statistics for total scores and for "Easy" and 
"Hard" subscores which correspond to Binder & Willis' (1991) 
research are presented in Table 3. Means itemized by age, 
gender and age x gender are presented in Tables 4 through 6, 
respectively. Statistics for Binder and Willis' (1991) 
normative group are included in Table 3 to facilitate 
comparisons with the present study. Means for Easy, Hard 
and total scores for the current normative sample were 
consistent with those obtained for Binder & Willis' small 
nonpatient control group (n=13) with discrepancies of less 
than one half point. 
An initial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed 
to determine whether there were significant differences 
between subjects who were admitted to the normative sample 
utilizing less stringent screening procedures (adopted later 
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in the data collection period) and those who were admitted 
with the regular criteria. These results were 
nonsignif icant. 
A test for homogeneity of the regressions was conducted 
to determine whether there were significant interactions 
between either or both of the between subjects factors 
(i.e., age and/or gender) and the medical risk scores. None 
of these analyses produced significant results (See Table 7 
for a summary of results), suggesting that the covariates 
could be entered in subsequent analyses without introducing 
interpretation problems. 
A covariate analysis of variance (CANOVA) was conducted 
to determine whether there were significant differences in 
PDRT total scores as a function of sex and/or age group 
membership without the influence of effects due to medical 
risk status (See Table 8 for summary of F-ratios). There 
were no significant interactions or main effects as a 
function of sex and/or age group membership. None of the 
covariates were significantly related to PDRT total scores. 
Two additional CANOVA's were conducted utilizing each of 
the subgrouping schemes for the PDRT scores (See Tables 8 
and 9 for a summary of F-ratios). An analysis of Easy and 
Hard scores as a function of sex and age group membership 
with medical risk scores entered as covariates yielded main 
effects for sex which were marginally significant on the 
Easy items F(1,119)= 3.88, p=.051 with males producing 
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higher scores than females (See Table 5 for means). With 
regard to the covariates, the "education" medical risk score 
which is comprised of questions related to educational 
difficulties (i.e., learning problems, special education 
services, etc.) was significantly related to the score for 
Easy items, F(1,119)=4.69, p<.05. The "early history" 
medical risk score which is comprised of questions related 
to prenatal, perinatal and early childhood medical problems 
was also related to the score for Easy items at a level 
approaching significance, F(l,119)=3.83, p=.053. No 
significant sex, age or sex x age effects or covariate 
effects were obtained for the Hard items. A second CANOVA 
was utilized to examine scores for Trial Blocks 1 through 4 
as a function of sex and age group membership. Significant 
main effects for sex were obtained for Trial Block 1, 
F(1,119) =9 . 35, JDC.OI, again with the mean score for males 
being higher than that for females. The "education" medical 
risk score was significantly related to scores on Trial 
Block 1, F(1,119)=8.59, pc.Ol. There were no significant 
covariate effects, main effects or interactions for scores 
on Trial Blocks 2 through 4. 
Analyses were conducted to investigate whether the 
total medical risk score (i.e., the composite score of all 
medical risk indices) was related to the PDRT total score or 
any of the subscores. Only one of these analyses produced 
significant results. The total risk score accounted for a 
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significant amount of the variance for Trial Block 1, 
£(1,119) =4 .31, £><. 05. 
Several analyses were conducted to determine the nature 
of effects associated with the increasing length of the 
interpolated delay interval (See Table 10 for a summary of 
results). An initial examination of means revealed a 
potential contradiction between the present findings and 
those from Binder & Willis' (1991) small norm sample. While 
in Binder and Willis' study, there is a slight decrement in 
performance between the Easy vs. Hard items, the opposite 
trend is observed in the present study (See Figure 1 for a 
graph of this trend). However, a within-subjects 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) revealed that the 
observed increment in performance between the Easy vs. Hard 
items was not significant. A more fine-grained analysis 
was conducted utilizing another MANOVA examining the within 
subjects factor of delay at three levels, across Trial 
Blocks 1 through 3. A significant effect for difficulty was 
obtained, F(2,238)=40.84, p<.001. This effect was examined 
more closely utilizing an examination of the means for the 
three trial blocks and successive MANOVA's to make 
comparisons between each trial block and the following trial 
block. This revealed a significant decrement in performance 
between Trial Block 1 and Trial Block 2 consistent with the 
hypothesis that poorer performance will result with an 
increased interpolated delay period, F(l,119)=49.90, pc.001. 
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However, a significant increment in performance was observed 
between Trial Block 2 and Trial Block 3, which contradicts 
the aforementioned hypothesis, F(l,119)=5.60, p<.05. An 
additional MANOVA revealed that there was a significant 
increment in performance between Trial Blocks 3 and 4 as 
well, F(l,119)=10.44, p<.01. See Figure 2 for a graph of 
mean scores as a function of delay across Trial Blocks 1 
through 4. 
Several analyses were employed to assess whether the 
Motivation and Compensation items administered following the 
PDRT were significantly related to the PDRT total score. 
The first item, which was intended to provide a self-
reported retrospective estimation of motivation, asked 
subjects to rate on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) the extent to which they felt they had 
performed to the best of their ability on the task. A 
MANOVA with special contrasts between adjacent means was 
utilized to determine if there were significant differences 
in total PDRT scores in accordance with this measure of 
self-reported motivation and, if so, what the direction and 
extent of these differences were. There were significant 
differences in total PDRT scores as a function of 
motivation, F(4,115)=4.14, pc.01. A closer examination of 
the effects utilizing the special contrasts between adjacent 
means revealed an interesting pattern of results. Because 
there was only one subject who responded "2," legitimate 
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statistical comparisons could not be made with this 
endorsement level. However, examination of the means for 
endorsements of "1" and "2" revealed that these subjects 
scored higher than individuals endorsing "3," which is 
contrary to the pattern that would be expected on an 
intuitive basis (i.e., increasing levels of performance with 
increasing levels of self-reported motivation). A t-test 
confirmed that the mean score for individuals endorsing "1" 
was significantly higher than that for individuals endorsing 
"3" (t=2.39, df=8, £><.05). Comparison of means for 
motivational levels 3, 4 and 5, revealed results which were 
consistent with what might be expected. Individuals 
responding "3" performed significantly more poorly than 
those responding "4" (t=-2.62, df=4, p<.01) and individuals 
responding "4" performed more poorly than individuals 
responding "5" at a level approaching significance (t=-1.96, 
df=4, £=.05). Scrutiny of the means across motivational 
categories revealed that the means for individuals 
responding "3" appeared consistently and significantly lower 
than means for all of the other motivational levels. 
Another MANOVA specifying contrasts between each 
motivational level and the mean across levels revealed that 
individuals responding "3" did in fact score significantly 
lower than the mean across levels, while this was not the 
case for any of the other motivational levels (t=-3.37, 
df=4, p<.001). 
27 
The Compensation item was intended to assess the extent 
to which subjects felt they would have performed better if 
they had received financial compensation to do so. The 
numbering convention was the same as for the previous item, 
with an endorsement of "1" meaning "strongly disagree" and 
"5" meaning "strongly agree." An ANOVA was conducted to 
determine the extent to which differential endorsements were 
related to differences in PDRT total scores. The results 
were not significant. See Table 11 for sample means 
associated with the various endorsements for the Motivation 
and Compensation items. 
Excluded Sample 
Data from the 89 subjects eliminated from consideration 
for the normative analysis due to neuromedical risk were 
analyzed for heuristic purposes with methods similar to 
those described for the normative sample. Descriptive 
statistics for this sample are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
Means itemized by age, gender and age x gender are presented 
in Tables 4 through 6, respectively. Dependent measures 
were itemized utilizing the same scheme as for the normative 
sample. Means for Easy, Hard and total scores were 
consistent both with the normative sample included in the 
present study and with the small normative sample described 
by Binder & Willis (1991) (See Table 3). 
Scrutiny of the means for the various scores for 
excluded vs. normal subjects in the present study revealed 
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that excluded subjects' mean scores were slightly but 
consistently lower than those for the normative sample by a 
margin of less than one half point. Several ANOVA's were 
conducted to determine whether PDRT total scores or any of 
the subscores for excluded subjects differed significantly 
from those for subjects in the normative sample. None of 
these tests produced significant results. Individuals 
eliminated from the normative sample due to neuromedical 
risk did not produce total scores or subscores which were 
significantly different than those produced by subjects 
included in the normative sample. 
As with the normative sample, a test for homogeneity of 
the regressions was conducted to determine whether there 
were significant interactions between either or both of the 
between subjects factors (i.e., age and/or gender) and the 
medical risk scores. Several of these analyses were 
significant, suggesting that a CANOVA like that performed on 
the data from the normative sample would be uninterpretable 
(See Table 12). Thus, straightforward analyses of variance 
(ANOVA's) were employed to investigate whether there were 
significant differences in any of the dependent measures as 
a function of sex and/or age group membership. None of 
these analyses produced significant results (See Table 13). 
Analyses were employed to assess whether increasing 
length of the interpolated delay period was associated with 
a decrement in scores (See Table 14 for a summary of 
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results). An initial examination of means revealed a slight 
increment in performance between the Easy vs. Hard items as 
was observed in the normative sample. However, as with the 
normative sample, a within-subjects multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) revealed that the observed increment was 
not significant (See Figure 3 for a graph of this trend). 
Another MANOVA was utilized to examine the within subjects 
factor of delay at three levels (5 sec., 15 sec. and 3 0 
sec.) across Trial Blocks 1 through 3. A significant effect 
for delay was obtained, F(2,176)=10.18, pc.001. This effect 
was examined more closely utilizing successive MANOVA's to 
make comparisons between contiguous trial blocks. As with 
the normative sample, there was a significant decrement 
between Trial Blocks 1 and 2 consistent with the hypothesis 
of poorer performance with increased length of the 
interpolated delay period, F(l,88)=20.23, p<.001. A MANOVA 
was utilized to investigate whether there was a significant 
difference between scores on Trial Blocks 2 and 3. In 
contrast with the normative sample findings, these scores 
were not significantly different. However, consistent with 
the results for the normative sample, there was a 
significant increment in scores between the third and fourth 
trial block, F(1,88)=14.02, p<.001. Please see Figure 4 for 
a graph of mean scores as function of delay across Trial 
blocks 1 through 4. 
The results of the Motivation item intended to measure 
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self-reported motivation to perform well on the task were 
examined in relation to PDRT total scores. A MANOVA 
including special contrasts between adjacent means was 
utilized to determine if there were significant differences 
in total PDRT scores in accordance with the various 
endorsements on the Motivation item and, if so, what the 
nature of these differences were. This analysis revealed 
that there were significant differences in total PDRT scores 
as a function of endorsed level of self-reported motivation 
toward the task, F(4,99.55)=3.19, p<.05. A closer 
examination of the effects by way of the special contrasts 
between means revealed that only one of the contiguous mean 
pairs was significantly different. As with the normative 
sample, the mean total scores for individuals responding "4" 
were significantly lower than the mean for individuals 
responding "5" (t=-2.94, df=4, pc.Ol). Scrutiny of the 
means revealed that the individuals endorsing "3" scored 
lower than the other four groups, as was the case with the 
normative sample. However, a comparison of the mean of the 
group endorsing "3" with the overall mean across groups 
produced nonsignificant results. 
An analysis of the Compensation item was conducted to 
determine whether there was a relationship between the item 
endorsement and PDRT total scores. Unlike the results of 
this analysis for the normative sample, the MANOVA utilized 
to investigate this relationship for excluded subjects 
produced significant results, F(4,83)=5.22, pc.Ol. Closer 
examination of the relationship between mean total scores 
for contiguous endorsements revealed that means associated 
with each of the adjacent endorsements were significantly 
different with one exception. Means for subjects endorsing 
"2" and "3" did not significantly differ. The mean total 
score for an endorsement of "1" was significantly higher 
than that for an endorsement of "2" (t=2.25, df=4, jo<.05). 
The mean total score for individuals endorsing "3" was 
significantly higher than that for individuals endorsing "4" 
(t=2.60, df=4, p<.05). The mean total score for subjects 
endorsing "4" was significantly lower than that for subjects 
endorsing "5" (t=-3.42, df=4, pc.001). An additional 
comparison was conducted to determine the extent to which 
the means for the various endorsement levels deviated from 
the overall mean across levels. Means for subjects who 
endorsed "1" and "4" were significantly different from the 
overall mean, with means associated with endorsements of "1" 
being significantly higher than the overall mean (t=3.16, 
df=4, pc.Ol) and the mean associated with an endorsement of 
"4" being significantly lower (t=-3.61, df=4, pc.001). The 
mean associated with an endorsement of "5" was higher than 
the overall mean at a level approaching significance 
(t=1.95, df=4, £=.05). Consult Table 15 for sample means 
associated with the various endorsements for the Motivation 
and Compensation items. 
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Discussion 
Introduction 
This study provided normative data for the Portland 
Digit Recognition Test. Additionally, it investigated 
whether there were significant differences in test scores as 
a function of age, sex and medical risk status. The extent 
to which the length of the interpolated delay period 
significantly impacted scores also was examined. Several 
hypotheses were put forth on the basis of existing research. 
These will be reviewed along with supporting or 
disconfirming evidence from the present study. A discussion 
of the results for the normative sample will be presented 
first, followed by a discussion of the results for the 
excluded sample. Finally, the results will be integrated 
and discussed in light of Binder and Willis' (1991) research 
and suggestions for future research will be provided. 
Normative Sample 
It was predicted that the frequency distribution of the 
recognition scores would be negatively skewed with all 
subjects producing scores at or above the chance level. It 
was predicted that the preponderance of subjects would 
produce scores considerably above chance and no subjects 
would produce scores significantly below chance. All of 
these hypotheses were supported. The lowest score was 49 
total correct out of a possible 72, which is considerably 
above the chance level. The results clearly were skewed in 
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a negative direction. The median score was 66 total 
correct, and the mode was 64. 
It was predicted that there would be significant 
differences between scores on Easy vs. Hard items, with a 
significant decrement in performance exhibited between the 
Easy items and the Hard items (Brown, 1958; Peterson and 
Peterson, 1959). This hypothesis was not supported with 
regard to the Easy vs. Hard items; rather, there was a 
nonsignificant increment between the Easy and Hard item 
scores. Consistent with the hypothesis of poorer 
performance with increasing delay, there was a significant 
decrement in performance between Trial Blocks 1 and 2. 
However, there was a significant increment in performance 
between Trial Blocks 2 and 3, which is exactly counter to 
the hypothesis. Further, there was a significant increment 
in performance between Trial Blocks 3 and 4. 
These results could be explained on the basis of 
practice effects; that is, subjects may exhibit increased 
skill at executing the task with repeated trials. It is 
possible that early in the test, the increase in length of 
the interpolated delay period from 5 sec. to 15 sec. was an 
important factor in terms of increasing the difficulty of 
the task. However, as the test progressed, subjects might 
have been able to compensate for the increased difficulty 
through strategies that were acquired with practice. This 
possibility is supported by comments made by subjects while 
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engaged in the task. On several occasions subjects reported 
discovering strategies to remember the numbers as the test 
progressed (e.g., remembering only the first and last digits 
of the strings). While not all of the strategies subjects 
described proved infallible, they had the potential of 
increasing their ability to answer correctly over time. It 
also is likely that a number of subjects developed 
strategies, but were hesitant to describe them to the 
examiner. Several subjects who described their strategies 
talked about them in terms of "beating the test" or figuring 
out the "trick" to the test; consequently, some subjects 
might have been hesitant to talk about strategies viewed in 
this way to the examiner. The fact that the PDRT consists 
of the same 18 five-digit target items repeated over the 
four trial blocks also could have contributed to practice 
effects. Subjects' increasing familiarity with the target 
items over time could have enhanced their ability to 
discriminate them from the distractor items. In any case, 
the fact that performance-enhancing strategies may be 
available to examinees certainly does not dilute the 
instrument's potential effectiveness in detecting 
malingering, rather it provides further justification to 
view poor performances with suspicion. 
The study also investigated whether scores varied 
significantly as a function of age, sex or medical risk 
status. There were no significant differences in scores in 
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accordance with age group membership, which is consistent 
with the literature in this area. With regard to gender, an 
unexpected main effect was discovered on Trial Block 1. Men 
produced significantly higher scores than women for these 
items. This is a finding which will need to be replicated 
by future investigators to ensure that it is not an artifact 
of the present research (e.g., the result of sampling error, 
etc.). Existing research does not suggest that men will 
produce higher scores on short delay digit recognition 
items, nor does it help to elucidate why this might occur. 
With regard to the medical risk scores, higher 
"education" risk scores were associated with lower scores on 
both the Easy items and Trial Block 1. The "education" risk 
score included four questions which asked about history of 
school retentions, learning problems in several subject 
areas, receiving special education services and referral to 
the school psychologist. Higher "early history" risk scores 
were associated with lower scores on Trial Block 1 at a 
level approaching significance. The "early history" risk 
score included six questions which asked about premature 
birth, birth problems, low birth weight, pregnancy 
complications, major illnesses before age 6 and febrile 
convulsions. The "total" medical risk score (i.e., the 
score comprised of all risk indices) also was related to 
scores on Trial Block 1 items. The fact that the medical 
risk scores were associated with a significant amount of 
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variation for Trial Block 1 scores only, suggests that these 
items may be sensitive to memory deficits associated with 
the various risk factors. It is possible that the medical 
risk covariates are significant on these earlier items and 
not on subsequent items, due to these earlier items being 
those which are most dependent on memory capacity, while 
later items may be more dependent on the practice effects 
described in the previous section. In other words, there is 
a slight possibility that the first trial block of the PDRT 
is a purer measure of actual memory capacity than subsequent 
trial blocks. During later trial blocks practice effects 
may become a more salient variable than memory; or at least, 
they may represent a confounding variable. This also may 
lend a modicum of support to the main effect for sex which 
was uncovered only on the first trial block. If men and 
women have actual differences in memory capacity for this 
type of digit recognition task, and if the aforementioned 
hypothesis regarding the potentially confounding nature of 
practice effects in later trial blocks is correct, these 
effects may be more likely to manifest themselves on the 
first trial block than on subsequent trial blocks. It 
should be noted that this is a very tentative hypothesis as 
no existing research has been found which supports the 
obtained effects. 
Differential endorsements on the Motivation item which 
was intended to measure self-reported motivation to perform 
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well on the task were associated with significant 
differences in PDRT total scores. The pattern of effects 
does not conform to what might be expected on an intuitive 
basis (i.e., increasing total scores associated with 
increasing levels of self-reported motivation). The fact 
that subjects endorsing "3" produced total scores at a level 
significantly lower than the mean across all other 
endorsements, suggests several possible interpretations. 
Subjects who respond in a fashion which may reflect 
negativity toward the task (e.g., endorsing "l" or "2M as 
their level of motivation) might also be expected not to 
engage in a very labor intensive introspection with regard 
to matching their level of motivation to an endorsement on 
the Motivation item, while subjects reporting at least an 
intermediate level of motivation or higher, might be 
expected to expend some effort in describing their actual 
level of motivation. Consequently, responses of "3" through 
"5" might reflect more accurate estimates of motivation 
than responses of "1" and "2." Another possible 
interpretation is that individuals responding at the 
extremes (i.e., "1" and "2" or "4" and "5") are more 
susceptible to errors in reading the direction of the scale 
than individuals who are responding "3," which is in the 
middle and unaffected by directional considerations. 
Because the distribution was skewed in the direction of 
responses of "4" and "5," this source of error might have 
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been attenuated at the high end of the scale, while there 
were too few responses at the low end of the scale to 
provide similar correction. 
Differential endorsements on the Compensation item 
which asks subjects to estimate the extent to which they 
feel they could perform better on the task if they were 
compensated to do so were not associated with variation in 
mean scores on the PDRT. However, an examination of the 
results of this item in conjunction with those from the 
Motivation item revealed an interesting finding with regard 
to individuals who endorsed "3" on the Motivation item (who 
were also the subjects who produced the lowest PDRT scores). 
Almost all of these individuals responded in the 
affirmative when asked if they could perform better at the 
task if they were to receive compensation, in that three of 
the four individuals responded "4" and the fourth responded 
"3" to that item. This is interesting in light of the fact 
that the modal response to this item was "1" with 
approximately 56% of the subjects responding "1." 
Consequently, those subjects responding "3" to the 
Motivation item seem to be saying that they are not 
performing to the best of their ability, but they could do 
better if they received compensation to do so. 
In summary, the results suggest that subjects may be 
aware of their level of motivation when responding to the 
PDRT. To the extent that it seems reasonable to expect that 
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"awareness" of motivation would be a prerequisite for 
intentional "modulation" of one's level of motivation, the 
possibility that intentionally produced motivational 
deficits could be manifested on the PDRT is supported by the 
present results. 
Excluded Sample 
As with the normative sample, hypotheses regarding the 
distribution of scores were supported. The frequency 
distribution of total scores for the excluded sample was 
negatively skewed with all subjects scoring appreciably 
above the chance level and no subjects scoring below chance. 
As with the normative sample, the lowest score was 49 total 
correct out of 72 total possible. The median number correct 
was 65 and the mode was 71. 
With regard to the hypothesis of poorer scores with 
longer interpolated delay intervals, scores for the excluded 
sample exactly paralleled those for the normative sample 
with one exception. There was not a significant increment 
in scores between Trial Block 2 and Trial Block 3 as was 
observed in the normative sample. This may be due to the 
smaller excluded sample size providing a less powerful test, 
or it may be attributable to some characteristic of the 
excluded sample which differs from the normative sample 
(e.g., neuromedical risk). If a practice effect is 
operative in countering the increased difficulty imposed by 
the longer delay interval as was hypothesized in the 
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previous section, it is possible that for excluded subjects 
this practice effect is not sufficiently powerful at that 
point in the test (between Trial Blocks 2 and 3) to 
compensate for the difficulty imposed by a longer delay 
interval. The possibility that the practice effect later 
becomes a sufficiently powerful mode of compensation is 
supported by the significant increment in scores observed 
between Trial Blocks 3 and 4. 
Scores for the excluded sample did not vary 
significantly as a function of age group or sex for PDRT 
total scores or any of the subscores. The absence of a sex 
main effect on Trial Block 1 for the excluded sample may be 
a result of differences in this sample relative to the 
normative sample (e.g., due to differential neuromedical 
risk status), or it may be due to this sample being of 
insufficient size to uncover the effect, if it exists. 
However, the absence of this effect in the excluded sample 
suggests even more strongly that this finding in the 
normative sample should be viewed cautiously and should be 
subjected to attempts at replication. 
Results for the Motivation item, were very similar to 
those for the normative sample in terms of trends; however, 
only one of these trends was significant for the excluded 
sample. Individuals endorsing "4" produced significantly 
lower scores than individuals endorsing "5." Means 
associated with endorsements of "3" through "5" again 
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conformed to what would be expected, with better total 
scores associated with higher self-reported motivational 
levels. In contrast, mean scores for endorsements of "1" 
through "3" exhibited the opposite pattern, with decreasing 
mean scores associated with successively higher levels of 
self-reported motivation. These results are not 
inconsistent with either of the interpretations put forth in 
the previous section. Again, it is possible that 
endorsements of "1" or "2" on the Motivation item may 
reflect these subjects' negativity toward the task, which 
could be expressed in their not expending sufficient energy 
introspecting about the item to provide an accurate estimate 
of motivation. The pattern of results also conforms to the 
alternate interpretation that some individuals endorsing 
motivational levels at the extreme ends of the item 
unwittingly could have reversed the direction when 
responding to the item. 
The Compensation item which was intended to measure 
subjects' estimation of their ability to enhance their 
performance if they received financial compensation to do so 
was found to be associated with significant variation in 
PDRT total scores, while this was not the case in the 
normative sample. It is difficult to discern a meaningful 
pattern when scrutinizing the results across the various 
endorsements. Subjects endorsing "1" and "5" obtained total 
scores which were significantly above the overall mean on 
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the PDRT, while subjects endorsing "4" scored significantly 
below that level. Similar to the subjects who endorsed "3" 
on the Motivation item in the normative sample, the subjects 
who endorsed "4" on the Compensation item may be the 
subjects in the excluded sample of the most interest to the 
present research. Scrutiny of data for the subjects who 
endorsed "4" on the Compensation item revealed that five out 
of six of these subjects endorsed "4" or "5" on the 
Motivation item. Thus, these subjects appear to be saying 
on the Motivation item that they performed their best on the 
PDRT (i.e., endorsement of "5") or almost their best (i.e., 
endorsement of "4"), yet they scored significantly lower 
than the overall mean for their peers. In responding to the 
Compensation item, these same subjects are agreeing to a 
moderately strong degree that they could score better if 
they were paid to do so. 
Within these seemingly contradictory responses may lie 
an important subgroup of responders; that is, individuals 
who say they performed as well as they could when their 
scores suggest otherwise, and go on a moment later 
essentially to admit they could do better if compensated to 
do so. It is as if when responding to the Motivation item 
that they are not attending to the apparent discrepancy 
between how they performed and how they might optimally 
perform if they applied themselves fully; however, a moment 
later they acknowledge that this discrepancy exists when 
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responding to the Compensation item. 
In responding to the Motivation item, these subjects 
are responding in a socially desirable direction, saying 
they applied themselves fully when perhaps they really did 
not (as evidenced by their low scores). In their response 
to the Compensation item, these subjects seem to abandon 
social desirability, both by contradicting their response to 
the Motivation item, and by answering in a direction that 
would seem to be the least socially desirable (i.e., saying 
that they would have done even better if they'd been paid, 
essentially admitting that they didn't do their best, 
despite admonitions by the examiner to try their best). 
This may be further testimony to the salience of financial 
gain as a reinforcer of behavior in that subjects may become 
less concerned about social desirability when the 
possibility of payment is addressed, without even a promise 
of actual compensation. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Overall, the present study supports the findings from 
Binder and Willis' (1991) research. Risk of neurological 
impairment as defined by the present study was not a 
significant determinant of PDRT scores. Scores for 
neurologically normal subjects did not differ from subjects 
at risk for neurological impairment. These results are 
consistent with Binder and Willis' finding that subjects 
with well-documented brain dysfunction who were not slated 
44 
to receive compensation obtained scores which were higher 
than those obtained by subjects with mild head injury who 
stood to receive compensation for their impairment. To the 
extent that the excluded subjects in the present study are 
comparable to the subjects with mild head trauma in Binder 
and Willis' research, which is a debatable issue, these 
results support the contention that the poorer performance 
of the mild head trauma patients who stood to receive 
financial compensation for their injuries was due to 
motivational differences rather than neurological 
impairment. 
Scores obtained in the present study fell slightly 
below those of Binder and Willis' small normative sample, 
but appreciably above their next highest scoring group, the 
"Brain Damaged-No Compensation" subjects (i.e., individuals 
with documented brain damage not in line for compensation) 
and well above the binomial probability level which would be 
cause for suspicion for malingering. Figure 5 presents a 
graph of scores for the present study along with those for 
Binder and Willis' various subject groups. Lines of 
demarcation are drawn at the level of Binder and Willis' 
cut-off scores (derived from the lowest scores obtained by 
"Brain Damaged-No Compensation" subjects) and at the scores 
which represent a binomial probability level which is 
significantly below chance (i.e., p<.05). The authors 
suggest that it is not necessary for scores on the PDRT to 
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be significantly below chance for the question of 
malingering to be raised, rather that scores below the cut­
off level should regarded with suspicion. 
Binder and Willis did not control for age and gender 
because their analyses suggested that there was no 
relationship between these variables and PDRT scores. The 
present study predominantly supported this course of action 
in that there were no age and gender effects, with the 
exception of the mean score for males on the 5 sec. items 
being higher than that for females. Binder and Willis did 
not indicate which dependent variables they analyzed as a 
function of age and gender. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that because they did not look at the 5 sec. items in 
isolation for any of their other analyses, this likely was 
also the case for the age and gender analyses. It is 
possible that if they had performed such analyses, they 
might have found significant gender effects for the 5 sec. 
items; however, given that there is no evidence in previous 
research for gender differences on this type of task, it 
seems at least as likely that the gender effect found in the 
present study is a spurious one which should be subject to 
replication before it is regarded with seriousness. 
Binder and Willis (1991) did not address directly the 
impact of the length of the interpolated delay interval on 
performance. There was a decrement in performance between 
the Easy and Hard items across all subject groups in their 
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study. The authors affirmed the existence of this decrement 
by reporting in the literature accompanying the PDRT test 
materials that "many patients will perform much worse on the 
Hard than the Easy items (p. 4)." This clearly was not the 
case for the present sample, in which there was a 
nonsignificant increment in performance between the Easy and 
Hard items and a significant increment in performance 
between Trial Blocks 1 and 2. 
There are several potential explanations for the 
different patterns observed in the present study as compared 
to Binder and Willis' research. It is possible that Binder 
and Willis' control group was too small to reveal this 
pattern. Also, subjects from Binder and Willis' sample with 
neurological impairment and/or "motivational differences" 
may exhibit a decrement in performance with an increasing 
delay interval for different reasons. The longer delay 
interval may present a greater challenge to subjects with 
sufficiently severe neurological impairment and/or these 
subjects may not exhibit the practice effects which were 
hypothesized to be responsible for the increment in 
performance exhibited in the present study. The finding 
that subjects in line for compensation did more poorly on 
the Hard items is consistent with Binder and Willis' 
contention that "motivationally different" subjects become 
less effective at the task when they are told with each 
successively longer interval that the test is "going to get 
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harder." 
It seems important to note that the examiner's warning 
that the task would get harder in the subsequent trial block 
did not appear to have the effect of decreasing performances 
of subjects in the present study on Trial Block 3. It is 
not possible to predict from the present data the extent to 
which this suggestion might have contributed to the 
significant decrement in performance between Trial Blocks 1 
and 2. In any case, the present results may point to an 
additional discriminative variable for use in detecting 
malingering. Binder reports in the literature accompanying 
the PDRT that "patients who are inclined to fake bad are 
more likely to do so as the interpolated activity interval 
increases (p. 2)." In contrast, the normative subjects in 
the present study performed better as the task progressed, 
rather than worse. It is possible that motivationally 
intact subjects with mild head trauma would exhibit the same 
pattern of performance. If this is found to be true, it 
will support the hypothesis that the decrement between Easy 
and Hard items observed in Binder and Willis' subjects who 
were in line for compensation was due to a motivational 
difference rather than neurological insult. Thus, 
observation of this pattern in a mild head trauma patient 
could serve as an additional signal for the clinician to 
further investigate the possibility of malingering. 
Results from the Motivation item support Binder and 
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Willis' research in that endorsements on the item were 
significantly related to PDRT total scores. These results 
suggest that individuals may be aware of differential levels 
of motivation when engaged in the PDRT, which would seem to 
be a necessary prerequisite to intentional modulation of 
motivation. 
Results from the Compensation item viewed in 
conjunction with Motivation item scores provide insight into 
distinct response patterns that may have some conceptual 
significance with regard to the phenomenon of malingering. 
While differential endorsements on the Compensation item 
were not significantly related to total scores for the 
normative sample, there were subgroup of individuals who 
admitted not performing their best on the Motivation item, 
who also did significantly more poorly than their peers, and 
who consistently reported that they believed they could have 
done better if they were paid to do so. For the excluded 
sample, Compensation item endorsements were significantly 
related to total scores. In this sample, there was an 
interesting subgroup who did more poorly on the task than 
their peers and who indicated moderately strong agreement 
that they could have done better if paid to do so, 
contradicting a previous statement that they had done as 
well or almost as well as they could on the task. 
Any subject who knowingly did not try to do their best 
on the PDRT after the examiner emphasized the importance of 
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their doing so prior to the test administration could be 
thought of as having engaged in a subtle form of 
malingering. The first subgroup admits to their low level 
of motivation on the PDRT and they go on to say that the 
discrepancy that they are admitting exists between the 
ceiling of their ability level and their present level of 
motivation could have been reduced at least to some degree 
if the incentive of money had been offered. The second 
subgroup denies a low level of motivation on the first item, 
but then acknowledges its existence in responding to the 
second item when the incentive of money is mentioned. This 
could be conceptualized in terms of schemata, theoretical 
cognitive structures which organize incoming information. 
The first group of subjects could be viewed as utilizing the 
same schema when answering both the Motivation and 
Compensation item (e.g., "I didn't do that well, but I could 
have done better if I'd been paid.") In contrast, it 
appears that the second group shifts from one schema to 
another when moving from the Motivation item to the 
Compensation item. When responding to the Motivation item, 
these individuals might have been responding in a way that 
is consistent with a positive self-schema and a positive 
social schema (e.g., "I was asked to do well and I did 
well."). However, the incentive of money described in the 
Compensation item might have caused a shift in schemata from 
that just described to one which relates to personal gain 
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(e.g., "When I am offered money, I will work hard to get 
it."). This theoretical schema shift could account for the 
contradiction between these subjects responses on the 
Motivation vs. the Compensation item. They could have very 
different ideas about what constitutes their "best" on 
boring, compulsory academic hurdles vs. what constitutes 
their "best" on any task which will yield personal profit. 
Viewed in this way, the responses to the two items may not 
be contradictory in the sense that they may be accurate 
reflections of two very different cognitive sets. If this 
were the case, it is conceivable that these subjects could 
have produced these two seemingly contradictory responses 
without suffering pronounced cognitive dissonance, which is 
the usual result when an individual engages in behavior 
which is discrepant from their prevailing attitudes 
(Festinger, 1957). 
Limitations of the Present Study and Directions for Future 
Research 
Due to the difficulty obtaining subjects in sufficient 
numbers especially in the older age groups, alternate 
methods of subject recruitment were adopted over time, which 
introduced an uncontrolled source of variation. The fact 
that these subjects were not all treated in the same way in 
terms of incentives to participate also represents a 
potential confounding factor. Some subjects were paid for 
their participation. Receiving financial compensation might 
have differentially affected these subjects performance on 
various aspects of the assessment. The payment might have 
had the effect of either improving or lowering these 
subjects' scores on the PDRT relative to those of subjects 
who were not paid. Also, it is possible that paid subjects 
might have construed the Compensation item differently from 
subjects who were not paid. Some might not have perceived 
the item with seriousness, due to the fact that they were 
already being paid for their participation. Fortunately, 
the number of subjects who either were paid for their 
participation, or were solicited outside the campus was 
small relative to the number who were recruited from 
university courses, lessening this source of uncontrolled 
variation. 
Also, the time span for data collection was expanded 
due to limited subject availability. This could have 
introduced error into the study in that the preponderance of 
data for older age groups was collected during a different 
season than that for the younger subjects. It is advisable 
that any attempt to replicate this study be conducted at a 
site where subjects in all targeted age groups are available 
in sufficient numbers so that the data can be collected 
within a relatively short span of time with uniform 
recruitment procedures utilized during the entire period. 
The only demographic variables for which data were 
collected in the present study were age and sex. In 
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retrospect, it would have been useful to collect data on 
years of education, years of employment, ethnicity and 
socioeconomic status (i.e., annual income) so that the 
population to which the current results generalize would be 
more fully defined. It would be advisable for researchers 
to collect data on these variables if the present study is 
replicated. 
Useful directions for future research would include 
conducting similar studies with motivationally intact 
subjects with various levels and types of neurological 
impairment. When he was told of the plan to initiate the 
present research, Dr. Binder suggested that a similar study 
of developmentally disabled subjects would be interesting 
and of benefit to practitioners. All of these studies would 
serve the function of providing normative data against which 
the test results of different types of patients could be 
compared. In addition, discerning patterns of performance 
for different types of subjects across the increasing 
interpolated delay interval would help to clarify whether 
this may be a reliable discriminative factor for use in 
detecting malingering. 
The hypotheses presented in the previous section with 
regard to the Motivation item and Compensation item are 
tentative and based upon post-hoc analyses of small subsets 
of data; however, it may be this type of qualitative 
analysis which will point to possible directions for future 
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research in this area with the eventual goal being the 
construction of a formal theory regarding the dynamics of 
malingering. As suggested in the introduction, it is often 
the case that the dynamics of phenomena which are associated 
with negative moral connotations are insufficiently 
examined, perhaps because there is a tendency 
unintentionally to vilify individuals who engage in the 
"bad" or "wrong" behavior and an associated inadvertent 
constriction of perspective on the behavior of these 
individuals. When engaging in research which examines the 
dynamics of socially undesirable behavior, it may be more 
productive to take an optimistic view of human beings which 
posits a strong positive self-actualizing tendency (e.g., 
Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1957), which may for various reasons 
become thwarted or suppressed. When our perspective 
broadens to that of understanding the complexities of 
deviations from what is normal or desirable behavior, 
solutions other than finding more effective means of 
"identifying the culprits" may become apparent. 
It has been apparent for some time that interpreting 
human behavior out of context can lead to erroneous 
conclusions, which is why systems theories that take into 
account multiple determinants of behavior provide promising, 
albeit complex, directions for psychological research (e.g., 
Powers, 1973). It seems that very different conclusions may 
be drawn as to why a patient who stands to receive financial 
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compensation for a minor head injury may perform less than 
optimally on a psychological evaluation if their entire 
history and current life circumstances are taken into 
account, than if the behavior is interpreted in isolation. 
The author has tested a number of head injured patients in a 
neuropsychological assessment lab during the past year. It 
has been observed that some minor head injured patients 
indicate as much (or more) distress about the changes in 
their functioning that they feel have come about as a result 
of their injuries, as individuals who have suffered moderate 
or severe trauma, who have experienced considerably greater 
functional losses. Young adults with minor head injuries 
seem to present with this level of distress most often. 
This apparent distress may be due, in part, to presumably 
greater self-awareness in younger and less impaired 
patients, as some describe noticing and being disturbed by 
subtle impairments in functioning since their injury. It 
also may be due to the often challenging nature of the 
transitional period of young adulthood. If these 
individuals were slated to receive compensation for their 
injuries, these expressions of distress might be explained 
in terms of their exaggerating subjective complaints to 
increase the probability that they will secure financial 
benefits. This may be true for some individuals; however, 
for others, it may be an inaccurate, or at least an 
incomplete explanation of what is occurring. It seems 
possible that a patient's perception of the extent of 
aftereffects of a minor injury during a demanding period of 
life could be exaggerated due to their awareness of the 
demands being placed upon them, with which they must 
continue to cope (e.g., employment, family needs). The 
likelihood that individuals with minor head injuries possess 
more acute self-awareness, relative to patients with more 
pronounced injuries, may further exaggerate the extent to 
which these individuals feel compromised by their injury. 
Also, it seems that any head injury which is sufficiently 
serious to warrant evaluation represents an entity to which 
an individual could attribute a variety of difficult life 
circumstances, some of which even might have preceded the 
injury. Some individuals may credit far greater functional 
incapacity to their injury than is warranted and at the same 
time may fear that they will not receive the financial 
support that they believe they need or deserve due to their 
perceived functional losses. Several patients indicated 
that they feared that the tests were not "getting at" (i.e., 
measuring) their impairments. All of these factors could 
contribute to these patients' performing less than optimally 
during a psychological evaluation. Research aimed at 
systematically examining the psychological sequelae of minor 
head injury, including the extent to which some individuals' 
perception of their post-injury functional capacity may 
exaggerate their level of impairment, not only during 
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psychological assessments, but also in their daily lives, 
may be useful. Examining the effects of age, life stage, 
personality characteristics and circumstances of injury on 
perception of injury also may be informative. If functional 
deficits that result from head injuries are found to be 
augmented by certain individuals' perception of their 
injuries, it is possible that interventions could be 
developed to increase these individuals' productivity, both 
within and outside of the assessment lab. 
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Table 1 
Breakdown of Excluded Subjects by Aae and Sex 
Males Females Total 
Age Group A 
(18-20) 10 6 16 
Age Group B 
(21-25) 14 2 16 
Age Group C 
(26-30) 9 6 15 
Age Group D 
(31-45) 21 21 42 
All Acre Groups 54 35 89 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores: 
Normative and Excluded Samples 
Trial Blocks 1 through 4 
Subject Trial Block 1 Trial Block 2 
group (5" items) (15" items) 
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Normative 
Sample 16.67 1.22 13-18 15.51 1.65 11-18 
(n=120) 
Excluded 
Sample 16.49 1.38 13-18 15.52 2.22 8-18 
(n=89) 
Normative 
Sample 
(n=120) 
Excluded 
Sample 
(n=89) 
Trial Block 3 
(3 0" items) 
Mean SD Range 
15.97 2.15 10-18 
15.76 2.15 8-18 
Trial Block 4 
(3 0" items) 
Mean SD Range 
16.52 1.74 11-18 
16.52 1.87 9-18 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores; 
Normative and Excluded Samples 
and Binder's (1991) Normative Group 
Easy. Hard and Total Scores 
Subject Easy Hard 
group (5"and 15" items) (3 0" items) 
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Normative 
Sample 32.18 2.28 26-36 32.48 3.44 22-36 
Excluded 
Sample 32.01 3.08 25-36 32.28 3.56 21-36 
Binder's 
(1991) 
Normative 
Sample 32.62 2.57 32.23 4.78 
(n=13) 
Subject 
group Total Score 
Mean SD Range 
Normative 
Sample 64.66 4.84 49-72 
Excluded 
Sample 64.29 5.86 49-72 
Binder's 
(1991) 
Normative 
Sample 64.85 6.59 
(n=13) 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores by Age Group: 
Normative and Excluded Sample 
Trial Blocks 1 and 2 
Subject Trial Block 1 Trial Block 2 
group (5" items) (15" items) 
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Normative 
Sample 
Group A 16.57 1.19 13-18 15.17 1.64 11-18 
(18-20) 
(n=30) 
Group B 16.53 1.28 14-18 15.40 1.59 12-18 
(21-25) 
(n=3 0) 
Group C 16.47 1.33 13-18 15.80 1.77 11-18 
(26-30) 
(n=3 0) 
Group D 17.10 .99 15-18 15.67 1.60 11-18 
(31-45) 
(n=3 0) 
Excluded 
Sample 
Group A 16.31 1.58 13-18 14.88 2.90 8-18 
(18-20) 
(n=16) 
Group B 16.19 1.52 13-18 15.06 2.32 11-18 
(21-25) 
(n=16) 
Group C 16.33 1.11 15-18 14.87 2.17 11-18 
(26-30) 
(n=15) 
Group D 16.74 1.34 13-18 16.17 1.77 12-18 
(31-45) 
(n=42) 
table continues 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores by Age Group: 
Normative and Excluded Samples 
Trial Blocks 3 and 4 
Subject Trial Block 3 Trial Block 4 
group (3 0" items) (3 0" items) 
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Normative 
Sample 
Group A 15.73 2.21 10-18 16.23 1.70 11-18 
(18-20) 
(n=3 0) 
Group B 16.00 2.00 11-18 16.47 1.72 12-18 
(21-25) 
(n=3 0) 
Group C 16.17 1.93 11-18 16.47 1.93 11-18 
(26-30) 
(n=3 0) 
Group D 15.97 2.51 10-18 16.90 1.63 12-18 
(31-45) 
(n=30) 
Excluded 
Sample 
Group A 15.38 2.19 12-18 17.06 1.48 13-18 
(18-20) 
(n=16) 
Group B 14.81 3.04 8-18 15.56 2.03 11-18 
(21-25) 
(n=16) 
Group C 15.87 1.96 12-18 16.20 1.37 9-18 
(26-30) 
(n=15) 
Group D 16.24 1.69 13-18 16.79 1.65 11-18 
(31-45) 
(n=42) 
table continues 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores by Age Group: 
Normative and Excluded Samples 
Easy and Hard Subscores 
Subject Easy Hard 
group (5" and 15" items) (30" items) 
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Normative 
Sample 
Group A 31.73 2.29 26-35 31.97 3.38 22-36 
(18-20) 
(n=30) 
Group B 31.93 2.10 27-35 32.47 3.40 25-36 
(21-25) 
(n=30) 
Group C 32.27 2.50 27-36 32.63 3.36 22-36 
(26-30) 
(n=3 0) 
Group D 32.77 2.18 26-36 32.87 3.73 23-36 
(31-45) 
(n=30) 
Excluded 
Sample 
Group A 31.19 3.78 25-36 32.44 3.10 26-36 
(18-20) 
(n=16) 
Group B 31.25 3.26 26-36 30.38 4.43 23-36 
(21-25) 
(n=16) 
Group C 31.20 2.62 27-35 32.07 3.90 21-36 
(26-30) 
(n=15) 
Group D 32.90 2.71 27-36 33.02 3.06 26-36 
(31-45) 
(n=42) 
table continues 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores by Age Group: 
Normative and Excluded Samples 
Total Score 
Subject 
group Total Score 
Mean SD Range 
Normative 
Sample 
Group A 63.70 5.23 49-71 
(18-20) 
(n=30) 
Group B 64.40 4.77 55-71 
(21-25) 
(n=30) 
Group C 64.90 4.17 55-71 
(26-30) 
(n=3 0) 
Group D 65.63 5.15 51-72 
(31-45) 
(n=3 0) 
Excluded 
Sample 
Group A 63.62 5.64 55-72 
(18-20) 
(n=16) 
Group B 61.63 7.37 51-72 
(21-25) 
(n=16) 
Group C 63.27 5.64 49-70 
(26-30) 
(n=15) 
Group D 65.93 5.01 53-72 
(31-45) 
(n=42) 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores by Gender: 
Normative and Excluded Samples 
Trial Blocks 1 through 4 
Subject Trial Block 1 
Group (5" items) 
Mean SD Range 
Trial Block 2 
(15" items) 
Mean SD Range 
Normative 
Group 
Males 16.90 1.24 13-18 
(n=60) 
Females 16.43 1.16 13-18 
(n=60) 
15.50 1.72 11-18 
15.52 1.59 11-18 
Excluded 
Group 
Males 
(n=54) 
Females 
(n=35) 
16.57 1.40 13-18 
16.37 1.37 13-18 
15.43 2.06 11-18 
15.66 2.47 8-18 
Trial Block 3 
(3 0" items) 
Mean SD Range 
Trial Block 4 
(30" items) 
Mean SD Range 
Normative 
Group 
Males 
(n=60) 
16.15 2.03 11-18 
Females 15.78 2.27 10-18 
(n=60) 
Excluded 
Group 
Males 
(n=54) 
15.57 2.36 8-18 
Females 16.06 1.78 12-18 
(n=35) 
16.57 1.77 11-18 
16.47 1.72 12-18 
16.41 1.90 9-18 
16.69 1.84 11-18 
table continues 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores by Gender: 
Normative and Excluded Samples 
Easy, Hard and Total Scores 
Subject Easy 
group (5" and 15" items) 
Mean SD Range 
Hard 
(30" items) 
Mean SD Range 
Normative 
Group 
Males 32.40 2.32 27-36 
(n=60) 
Females 31.95 2.24 26-36 
(n=60) 
32.72 3.28 22-36 
32.25 3.61 23-36 
Excluded 
Group 
Males 
(n=54) 
32.00 2.91 26-36 
Females 32.03 3.36 25-36 
(n=35) 
31.98 3.79 21-36 
32.74 3.17 26-36 
Subject Total Score 
group Mean SD Range 
Normative 
Group 
Males 65.12 4.61 49-72 
(n=60) 
Females 64.20 5.06 51-72 
(n=60) 
Excluded 
Group 
Males 63.98 5.90 49-72 
(n=54) 
Females 
(n=35) 
64.77 5.85 53-72 
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores 
by Sex and by Age Group: 
Normative and Excluded Samples 
Total Scores 
Subject Normative Sample Excluded Sample 
group Total Score Total Score 
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Group A 64.73 5.32 49-71 63.90 5.38 56-72 
(18-20)/ 
Males 
(n=10) 
Group A 62.67 5.11 53-69 63.17 6.55 55-70 
(18-20)/ 
Females 
(n=6) 
Group B 64.40 4.66 55-71 61.00 7.45 51-72 
(21-25)/ 
Males 
(n=14) 
Group B 64.40 5.05 55-71 66.00 7.07 61-71 
(21-25)/ 
Females 
(n=2) 
Group C 64.13 4.84 55-70 63.44 6.91 49-70 
(26-30)/ 
Males 
(n=9) 
Group C 65.67 3.37 62-71 63.00 3.52 59-69 
(26-30)/ 
Females 
(n=6) 
Group D 67.20 3.10 62-72 66.24 3.49 61-71 
(31-45)/ 
Males 
(n=21) 
Group D 64.07 6.33 51-72 65.62 6.26 53-72 
(31-45) 
Females 
(n=15) 
table continues 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores 
by Sex and by Age Group: Normative Sample 
Trial Blocks 1 and 2 
Subject Trial Block 1 Trial Block 2 
Group (5" items) (15" items) 
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Group A 16.93 1.03 15-18 15.13 1.81 11-18 
(18-20)/ 
Males 
(n=15) 
Group A 16.20 1.26 13-18 15.20 1.52 13-18 
(18-20)/ 
Females 
(n=15) 
Group B 16.60 1.40 14-18 15.33 1.91 12-18 
(21-25)/ 
Males 
(n=15) 
Group B 16.47 1.19 14-18 15.47 1.25 14-17 
(21-25)/ 
Females 
(n=15) 
Group C 16.60 1.55 13-18 15.73 1.94 11-18 
(26-30)/ 
Males 
(n=15) 
Group C 16.47 1.19 14-18 15.47 1.25 14-17 
(26-30)/ 
Females 
(n=15) 
Group D 17.47 .74 16-18 15.80 1.21 14-18 
(31-45)/ 
Males 
(n=15) 
Group D 16.73 1.10 15-18 15.53 1.96 11-18 
(31-45) 
Females 
(n=15) 
table continues 
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores 
by Sex and by Age Group: 
Normative Sample 
Trial Blocks 3 and 4 
Subject Trial Block 3 Trial Block 4 
group (30" items) (3 0" items) 
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Group A 16.00 2.10 11-18 16.67 1.80 11-18 
(18-20)/ 
Males 
(n=15) 
Group A 15.47 2.36 10-18 15.80 1.52 13-18 
(18-20)/ 
Females 
(n=15) 
Group B 16.13 2.00 12-18 16.33 1.59 13-18 
(21-25)/ 
Males 
(n=15) 
Group B 15.87 2.07 11-18 16.60 1.88 12-18 
(21-25)/ 
Females 
(n=15) 
Group C 15.80 2.40 11-18 16.00 2.42 11-18 
(26-30)/ 
Males 
(n=15) 
Group C 16.53 1.30 15-18 16.93 1.16 15-18 
(26-30)/ 
Females 
(n=15) 
Group D 16.67 1.68 13-18 17.27 .80 16-18 
(31-45)/ 
Males 
(n=15) 
Group D 15.27 3.03 10-18 16.53 2.13 12-18 
(31-45) 
Females 
(n=15) 
table continues 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores 
by Sex and by Age Group; 
Normative Sample 
Easy and Hard Scores 
Subject Easy Hard 
Group (5" and 15" items) (3 0" items) 
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Group A 32.07 2.31 27-35 32.67 3.39 22-36 
(18-20)/ 
Males 
(n=15) 
Group A 31.40 2.29 26-35 31.27 3.33 24-36 
(18-20)/ 
Females 
(n=15) 
Group B 31.93 2.46 27-35 32.47 3.14 26-36 
(21-25)/ 
Males 
(n=15) 
Group B 31.93 1.75 30-35 32.47 3.76 25-36 
(21-25)/ 
Females 
(n=15) 
Group C 32.33 2.72 27-36 31.80 4.23 22-36 
(26-30)/ 
Males 
(n=15) 
Group C 32.20 2.37 29-35 33.47 2.00 30-36 
(26-30)/ 
Females 
(n=15) 
Group D 33.27 1.62 30-36 33.93 1.91 30-36 
(31-45)/ 
Males 
(n=15) 
Group D 32.27 2.58 26-36 31.80 4.77 23-36 
(31-45) 
Females 
(n=15) 
table continues 
76 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores 
by Sex and by Age Group: 
Excluded Sample 
Trial Blocks 1 and 2 
Subject Trial Block 1 
Group (5" items) 
Mean SD Range 
Trial Block 2 
(15" items) 
Mean SD Range 
Group A 
(18-20)/ 
Males 
(n=10) 
16.30 1.49 14-18 15.00 2.26 12-18 
Group A 
(18-20)/ 
Females 
(n=6) 
16.33 1.86 13-18 14.67 3.98 8-18 
Group B 
(21-25)/ 
Males 
(n=14) 
Group B 
(21-25)/ 
Females 
(n=2) 
16.07 1.54 13-18 
17.00 1.41 16-18 
14.86 2.41 11-18 
16.50 .71 16-17 
Group C 
(26-30)/ 
Males 
(n=9) 
Group C 
(26-30)/ 
Females 
(n=6) 
16.78 1.20 15-18 
15.67 .52 15-16 
15.33 2.12 12-18 
14.17 2.23 11-17 
Group D 
(31-45)/ 
Males 
(n=21) 
Group D 
(31-45) 
Females 
(n=15) 
16.95 1.28 13-18 
16.52 1.40 13-18 
16.05 1.63 13-18 
16.29 1.93 12-18 
table continues 
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores 
by Sex and by Age Group: 
Excluded Sample 
Trial Blocks 3 and 4 
Subject Trial Block 3 
Group (30" items) 
Mean SD Range 
Trial Block 4 
(30" items) 
Mean SD Range 
Group A 
(18-20)/ 
Males 
(n=10) 
15.80 2.30 12-18 16.80 1.81 13-18 
Group A 
(18-20)/ 
Females 
(n=6) 
Group B 
(21-25)/ 
Males 
(n=14) 
14.67 1.97 12-17 
14.57 3.13 8-18 
17.50 .55 17-18 
15.50 2.03 11-18 
Group B 
(21-25)/ 
Females 
(n=2) 
16.50 2.12 15-18 16.00 2.83 14-18 
Group C 
(26-30)/ 
Males 
(n=9) 
Group C 
(26-30)/ 
Females 
(n=6) 
15.33 2.12 12-18 
16.67 1.51 14-18 
16.00 2.92 9-18 
16.50 1.38 15-18 
Group D 
(31-45)/ 
Males 
(n=21) 
16.24 1.73 13-18 17.00 .95 15-18 
Group D 
(31-45) 
Females 
(n=15) 
16.24 1.70 13-18 16.57 2.13 11-18 
table continues 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Test Scores 
by Sex and by Age Group: 
Excluded Sample 
Easy and Hard Scores 
Subject Easy 
Group (5" and 15" items) 
Mean SD Range 
Hard 
(30" items) 
Mean SD Range 
Group A 
(18-20)/ 
Males 
(n=10) 
31.30 3.20 27-36 32.60 3.69 26-36 
Group A 
(18-20)/ 
Females 
(n=6) 
31.00 4.94 25-36 32.17 2.04 30-34 
Group B 
(21-25)/ 
Males 
(n=14) 
30.93 3.32 26-36 30.07 4.46 23-36 
Group B 
(21-25)/ 
Females 
(n=2) 
33.50 2.12 32-35 32.50 4.95 29-36 
Group C 
(26-30)/ 
Males 
(n=9) 
32.11 2.67 28-35 31.33 4.64 21-36 
Group C 
(26-30)/ 
Females 
(n=6) 
29.83 2.04 27-33 33.17 2.40 30-36 
Group D 
(31-45)/ 
Males 
(n=21) 
33.00 2.41 27-36 33.24 2.43 28-36 
Group D 
(31-45) 
Females 
(n~15) 
32.81 3.04 27-36 32.81 3.63 26-36 
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Table 7 
Test for Homogeneity of the Regressions: 
Summary of F-ratios for the Normative Sample 
PDRT Score F-ratio 
Total 1.11 
Easy Items 1.07 
Hard Items 1.01 
Trial Block 1 .90 
Trial Block 2 1.39 
Trial Block 3 .88 
Trial Block 4 1.19 
Notes: 
df=49 
aE<.01 bp<. 05 c£><. 10 
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Table 8 
Summary of F-ratios for Covariate Analyses of Variance; 
Normative Sample 
PDRT Total scores. Easy and Hard subscores 
PDRT Subscores 
Total Score Easy Score Hard Score 
Main effects 
Sex 1.83 3.88° .37 
Group .73 .97 .31 
2-way interactions 
Sex by Group 1.43 .41 1. 60 
Covariates 
Early History 3.30° 3.83° 1.59 
Education 1.58 4. 69b .12 
Mild Head Injury .04 .63 .05 
Toxic Risk .19 1.28 .01 
Anoxic Risk . 00 . 03 .04 
Illness .02 .28 .30 
Family History .02 . 00 . 02 
Notes; 
df=l for sex main effects and each of covariates 
df=3 for group main effects and interaction effects 
aE<.01 bE< . 05 cE<.10 
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Table 9 
Summary of F-ratios for Covariate Analyses of Variance: 
Normative Sample 
Trial Blocks 1 through 4 
PDRT Subscores 
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
(5" delay) (15" delay) (30" delay) (30" delay) 
Main effects 
Sex 9.35" .29 .31 .00 
Group 1.36 .83 .25 .69 
2-way interactions 
Sex x Group .58 .11 .96 .14 
Covariates 
Early History 3.90c 1.57 .89 1.81 
Education 8.59a .78 .09 1.2 6 
Mild Head Inj. 1.07 .12 .43 1.68 
Toxic Risk .01 2.46 .04 .00 
Anoxic Risk .87 .14 .51 .24 
Illness .03 .68 .001 .28 
Family History .12 .12 .05 .02 
Notes: 
df=l for sex main effects and each of covariates 
df=3 for group main effects and interaction effects 
aE<.01 b£><. 05 °£<. 10 
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Table 10 
Summary of F-Ratios from MAN0VA/s Assessing 
Effect of Length of Delay Interval on PDRT Scores: 
Normative Sample 
Effect F-Ratio 
Within-Subjects Effect 
of Delay (Trial Blocks 1-3) 18.82s 
Comparisons of Means 
Trial Block 1 (X=16.67) > Trial Block 2 (X= 15. 51) 49. 90" 
Trial Block 2 (X=15.51) < Trial Block 3 (X= 15. 97) 5. 60b 
Trial Block 3 (X=15.97) < Trial Block 4 (X= 16. 52) 10. 44a 
Easy (X=32.18) < Hard (X=32.48) 1. 07 
Notes: 
df=1 
aE<. 01 bp< . 0 5 c£<. 10 
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Table 11 
Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Total Scores for Motivation 
and Compensation Item Endorsements: Normative Sample 
Motivation Item Question: 
Do you feel that you performed to the best of your ability 
on this test? 
Endorsement Mean SD n 
1 ("strongly disagree") 64.66 3.20 6 
2 70.00 .00 1 
3 57.00 6.97 4 
4 63.44 5.40 29 
5 ("strongly agree") 65.41 4.24 80 
Whole Group Mean 64.65 4.60 120 
Compensation Item Question: 
Do you feel that you might have performed better if you 
received financial compensation to do so? 
Endorsement Mean SD n 
1 ("strongly disagree") 65.14 4.79 67 
2 64.46 3.83 15 
3 64.71 5.23 14 
4 63.91 6.15 12 
5 ("strongly agree") 62.83 4.52 12 
Whole Group Mean 64.65 4.86 120 
Table 12 
Test for Homogeneity of the Regressions: 
Summary of F-ratios for the Excluded Sample 
PDRT Score F-ratio 
Total .05 
Easy Items 2 . 06b 
Hard Items 1.25 
Trial Block 1 1.18 
Trial Block 2 2 . 94" 
Trial Block 3 .87 
Trial Block 4 2 .20b 
Notes: 
df=39 
aj)<. 01 ^<.05 ^<.10 
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Table 13 
Summary of F-ratios for 
Excluded Sample 
Analyses of Variance: 
Trial Blocks 1 throucrh 4 
PDRT Subscores 
Block 1 
(5" delay) 
Block 2 Block 3 
(15" delay) (30" delay) (30 
Block 4 
" delay) 
Main effects 
Sex 1.21 
Group 1.10 
.00 .17 
2.27 1.65 
. 00 
2.15 
2-way interactions 
Sex by Group .96 .53 1.25 .49 
Total scores. Easy and Hard subscores 
PDRT Subscores 
PDRT 
Total Score 
Easy Items Hard 
(5" and 15" delay) (3 0" 
Items 
delay) 
Main effects 
Sex .00 
Group 2.34 
.26 
2 .40c 
. 09 
1.90 
2-way interactions 
Sex x Group .49 1.04 .64 
Notes: 
df=l for sex main effects 
df=3 for group main effects and interaction effects 
lg<. 01 b]0< . 0 5 c£< . 10 
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Table 14 
Summary of F-Ratios for MANOVA's Assessing the Effect of 
Length of Delay Interval on PDRT Scores: Excluded Sample 
Effect 
Within-Subjects Effect 
o f  D e l a y  ( T r i a l  B l o c k s  1 - 3 )  
F-Ratio 
10.18s 
Comparisons of Means 
Trial Block 1 (X=16.49) > Trial Block 2 (X=15.52) 20.23s 
Trial Block 2 (X=15.52) < Trial Block 3 (X=15.76) 1.12 
Trial Block 3 (X=15.76) < Trial Block 4 (X=16.52) 14.02s 
Easy (X=32.01) < Hard (X=32.28) .64 
Notes: 
df=l 
aE<.01 b£<. 05 c£<. 10 
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Descriptive Statistics for PDRT Total Scores for Motivation 
and Compensation Item Endorsements: Excluded Sample 
Motivation Item Question: 
Do you feel that you performed to the best of your ability 
on this test? 
Endorsement Mean SD n 
1 ("strongly disagree") 63.66 3.21 3 
2 61. 00 8 . 88 3 
3 59.75 4.99 4 
4 61. 78 6.22 23 
5 ("strongly agree") 65.85 5.24 56 
Whole Group Mean 64.29 5.58 89 
Compensation Item Question: 
Do you feel that you might have performed better if you 
received financial compensation to do so? 
Endorsement Mean SD n 
1 ("strongly disagree") 65.93 4.98 46 
2 62. 63 6.22 19 
3 63.55 5.17 9 
4 56.16 3.81 6 
5 ("strongly agree") 66.12 6.57 8 
Whole Group Mean 64.32 5.38 88* 
Notes: 
*data was missing for one subject 
Figure 1 
88 
Length of Delay: 
Effect  on PDRT Scores 
40 
30 
20 
Mean Score 
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Normative Sample: Easy vs. Hard Items 
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Figure 2 
Length of Delay: 
Effect  on PDRT Scores 
20 
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10 
5 
0 
Normative Sample: Blocks 1-4 
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Figure 3 
Length of Delay: 
Effect  on PDRT Scores 
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Figure 4 
Length of Delay: 
Effect  on PDRT Scores 
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Excluded Sample: Blocks 1-4 
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Figure 5 
PDRT Scores for Subject Groups: 
Norm, Excluded, Binder & Willis (1991) 
PDRT Score (raw # correct) 
i ce 
Easy Hard Total 
PDRT Score (Name) 
Series A NERM SAMPTO («UIT*BI) 
Series E 
Series B _J Series C Series D 
IT«LU4*4 U&P'II («MTT*AT) NCAPATTOBWHFT CCSKP (BTAA»R) BR*IA Q*SMHF»4-NC C«MP 
_J Series F 
Ait MM D)»ER4*R-H« CEMP (ANTE*) MIL* 8M4 TFWUIM-OIAP 
Series A=Normative;B=Excluded;C=Nonpt-No 
Comp,D=BD —NoComp;E = AD-NoComp;F=MHT—Comp; 
G=BD—Comp;H=Nonpt —Comp(Simulators) 
Series G Series H 
BRATS RBM>P Trmp (AN4V) MEB-PACMAT-COT&P (SIMULATOR*) 
Notes: 
"Comp"=subjects in line for compensatn 
"No Com.p"=Ss not in Iin« for comptnaat'n 
APPENDIX A 
Preliminary Screening 
Neurological History 
Yes No 
1. Have you ever been evaluated by a 
neurologist or neurosurgeon? 
2. * Have you ever had any of the 
following tests? 
Skull X-ray 
EEG/BEAM 
CAT Scan 
MRI Scan 
PET 
Art er i ogr aphy 
Spinal Tap 
Pneumoencephalogram 
Neuropsychological Testing 
3.* Have you ever had brain surgery? 
4.* Have you ever been diagnosed with 
any of the following? 
Brain Tumor 
Encephalitis 
Meningitis 
Multiple Sclerosis 
Parkinson's Disease 
Polio 
Neurosyphilis 
Stroke 
Huntington's Chorea 
Epilepsy 
5.* Have you ever had any seizures? 
Psychiatric History Yes No 
1. Have you ever had a mental health 
evaluation? 
2 . "  Have you ever been hospitalized for 
mental health treatment? 
Diagnosis? 
3.* Have you ever received electric shock 
treatments? 
Drug History 
1. Have you ever taken or been prescribed 
any of the following? Yes No 
'Antidepressants 
Tofranil 
Elavil 
Vivactil 
Sinequan 
Aventyl 
Pertofrane 
Norpramin 
Prozac 
Desyrel 
Ascendin 
'Anticonvulsants 
Dilantin 
Phenobarbital 
Tegretol 
Celontin 
Clonopin 
Mepoline 
Mysoline 
Zarontin 
Others 
'Major tranquilizers 
Thorazine 
Stelazine 
Prolixin 
Mellaril 
Haldol 
Navane 
Moban 
Lithium 
Hallucinogens Yes No 
Marijuana 
'How often? (>2x/week) 
LSD, Mescaline, Peyote, STP, 
DMT, Psilocybin 
'How often? (>50x) 
'in the past month? 
'Heroin, Opium, Hashish 
'Cocaine, Crack, Ecstasy 
Inhalents 
*How often? (10x)_ 
*In the past week? 
Yes 
Hypnotics 
*How often (>50x/year) 
*In the past week? 
Stimulants 
Dexedrine 
Dexamyl 
Biphetamine 
Benzedrine 
Desoxyn 
Preludin 
Ritalin 
*How long? (>20 years) 
*In the past week? 
Minor Tranquilizers 
Chlordiazepoxide (Librium) 
Diazepam (Valium) 
Oxazepam (Serax) 
Clorazepate (Tanxene) 
Meprobamate (Equanil, Miltown) 
Hydroxyzine (Atarax, Vistaril) 
Xanax (Alprazolam) 
Lorazapam (Ativan) 
Buspirone (Buspar) 
*In the past week? 
Sleeping Pills 
Seconal ("Reds") 
Nembutal 
Tuinal 
Phenobarbital 
Butabarbital 
Amytal 
Quaalude 
Doriden 
Dalmane 
Chloral Hydrate 
Noludar 
Placidyl 
Halcion 
*In the past week? 
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Pain Drugs Yes No 
Talwin 
Morphine 
Codeine 
Percodan 
Numorphan 
Darvon, Darvocet, Darvon "N" 
Methadon 
Demerol 
Dilaudid 
Fiorinal 
*In the past week? 
'Have you ever been treated for alcoholism? Yes No 
Are you taking any medications at this time? 
How much caffeine have you had 
today? 
When was your last dose of 
caffeine? 
At what age did you have your first, full alcoholic 
beverage? 
Exclusion Criteria* 
Subjects were excluded from this study if any of the 
following 
criteria were met. 
1) They had been diagnosed with a neurological disease or 
they had undergone special neurodiagnostic tests indicating 
clinical suspicion of a neurological problem. 
2) They had experienced major brain trauma. 
3) They had been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder. 
4) They smoked or had smoked marijuana more than 2 times 
per week. 
5) They had used hallucinogens more than 50 times per year 
and/or in the previous week. 
6) They had ever used cocaine, crack, ecstasy, or heroin. 
7) They had used stimulants more than 20 times per year 
and/or in the previous week. 
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8) They had used minor tranquilizers in the previous week. 
9) They had used major tranquilizers, antidepressants, or 
anticonvulsants on a regular basis for at least one year 
preceding the study. 
10) They had used inhalants more than 10 times and/or in the 
previous week. 
11) They had suffered more than 3 minor head injuries with 
at least one resulting in a concussion or loss of 
consciousness. 
12) They had ever lost consciousness for more than 5 
minutes. 
*Grant et al, 1978 and Grant, Adams, & Reed, 1974 
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APPENDIX B 
Medical Risk Screening 
Early History 
Yes No ? 
1. Were you born prematurely by one 
month or more? 
2. Were there any birth problems? 
3. Did you weigh 5 pounds or more at 
birth? 
4. Were there any difficulties with your 
mothers pregnancy before your birth? _ 
5. Did you have a major illness before 
age 6? 
What illness? 
6. Did you ever have febrile 
convulsions? 
Education 
1. Were you ever held back in school? 
2. Did you have any learning problems 
with reading, writing, spelling, 
or math? 
3. Did you ever receive special 
education or special tutoring? 
4. Were you ever referred to the school 
psychologist? 
5. What was your high school grade point 
average? 
9Minor Head Injury 
1. Have you ever sustained a 
head injury? 
How many? (>3) 
2. Have you ever lost consciousness 
due to a head injury? 
How long? (>5') 
Toxic Risk 
1. Have you ever lost consciousness due 
to alcohol or drug ingestion? 
2. Have you ever had a blackout due to 
alcohol or drug ingestion? 
3. Have you experienced a withdrawal 
due to alcohol or drug ingestion? 
Anoxic Risk 
1. Have you ever had generalized 
anesthesia? 
2. Have you ever needed cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation? 
3. Have you ever had poisoning from the 
following? 
Carbon Monoxide 
Metallic poisoning 
Bromide/Pesticide 
Illness Risk 
1. Have you ever had or do you have 
any of the following? 
Hypertens ion 
Arthritis 
Anemia 
Diabetes 
Liver Disease 
Arteriosclerosis 
Coronary Heart Disease 
Pulmonary Disease 
Emphysema 
Systemic Lupus Erthematosus 
(autoimmune disease) 
2. Have you ever had artificial 
respiration? 
3. Have you ever had fevers of 
104 degrees or more? 
Family History 
1. Has or does anyone in your immediate 
family suffer from alcoholism? 
2. Has anyone in your immediate family 
ever had a neurological problem? 
Relationship? 
Problem? 
3. Has anyone in your immediate family 
ever had a psychiatric problem? 
Relationship? 
Problem? 
4. Has anyone in your immediate family 
ever had a learning disability? 
Relationship? 
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APPENDIX C 
PDRT Instructions to the Patient 
Laurence M. Binder c. 1989, 1990 
"I want you to remember a number that I will read to you. 
After I read it to you, I want you to count backward from 20 
to 1, like this: 20, 19, 18, and so on. Then, I'll show you 
a card with two numbers on it. One of them is the number I 
asked you to remember. Read the number you remember from 
the card. The first number to remember is (first item). 
Now count backwards from 20." 
Interrupt S by presenting response card after 5 seconds for 
each item. If necessary, interrupt S by asking, "Which one 
was it?" Give feedback, "right" or "wrong" for every 
response. 
After 18 items with 5-sec delay, say "You're doing just 
fine." Don't praise if S is correct on less than 12 of 18). 
Then say, "Now it's going to get harder. Now, after I read 
the number I want you to count backwards from 50. Before, I 
was only giving you 5 seconds to count, but now I will give 
you 15 seconds, so it will be harder. The first number to 
remember is (read first number)." 
After 18 items with 15-sec delay, repeat essentially the 
same instructions, except that the counting is from 100, and 
there is a 30 sec delay. At 30-sec delay, administer 3 6 
items in order to complete the full test. 
There are only 18 different items and 36 response cards. 
The same items are repeated four times, and each response 
card is used twice on the 72 item test. 
Be sure to give feedback after each response and to praise 
for good performance after 18 5-sec items and 18 15-sec 
items only if S is correct on at least 12. All Ss are told 
that the test is getting harder at the transitions from 5-
sec to 15-sec and 15-sec to 3 0 sec. 
APPENDIX D 
PORTLAND DIGIT RECOGNITION TEST 
L-•  /tfl 
71394 
Five 
Second 
Fifteen 
Second 
Thirty 
Second 
27586 
58192 
38295 
72819 
94376 
-
56392 
82193 
81293 
47391 
48526 
86524 
47159 
74629 
38295 
59182 
12853 
28149 
Total 
Correct 
E.ASV (4 AR. b 
total corr 
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APPENDIX E 
Post-Assessment 
Motivation and Compensation Items 
Circle the number below each question which corresponds best 
with your feeling. 
Please respond as honestly as possible. 
1. Do you feel that you performed to the best of your 
ability on this test? 
1 2 3 4 5 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
2. Do you feel that you might have performed better if you 
received financial compensation to do so? 
1 2 3 4 5 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
